Friday, September 5, 2025

WORK FROM HOME REMOTE STATION!!!
PUTTING MY LIFE BACK TOGETHER

I HAVE ALL STALKING SINCE FILING 2024L002166 TO REPORT
PAST 5 YEARS

FREE LEGAL ADVICE... Searching for Pro Bono Lawyer

Thank you for sending the motion to dismiss the appeal. It is now clear to me that the appellate court's dismissal was proper. Appellate courts only have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a circuit court order that meets the legal definition of a "final order." In this case, Judge Flanagan's order, even assuming that it was not properly entered, does not qualify as a "final order" because a dismissal for want of prosecution does not ultimately end your dispute. When a case is dismissed for want of prosecution, you are able to re-file it as a new case within one year after the dismissal. For that reason, it is not a "final order."

If you have not already filed a complaint against Judge Flanagan, I strongly recommend that you do not file it. Complaints to the judicial inquiry board are designed for unethical conduct by a judge. Disagreeing with a ruling - even one that you believe violates the law - does not qualify as unethical.

As a supervising judge of the motion section, Judge Flanagan certainly had jurisdiction over your case. Arguably, her order was improper if you did not have proper notice of the hearing date. It is possible that this date was set near the outset of the case, with notice provided by postcard or electronic service.

If you did not have notice of the May 2 hearing, it is still very likely that Judge Dempsey still would have dismissed your case for want of prosecution on May 22. That is because the court's online docket does not reflect that the remaining defendants in the case were properly served with the complaint and summons. Service in any way other than in-person delivery (if in Illinois, by a sheriff, and if outside of Illinois, by a sheriff or other process server) is not valid. Moreover, service must be accomplished within 30 days after the summons is issued by the court clerk. After that, you must request an "alias summons" and serve that within 30 days. You should also understand that serving a registered agent only applies when you a serving a corporation. Individual defendants do not have registered agents.

If you choose to re-file this case, I strongly recommend that you hire a lawyer. Cases involving this amount of money by a pro se plaintiff have almost no chance of being successful. This is the type of case that a lawyer who charges fees might take on a contingency basis, meaning that any legal fees are owed only if you recover a settlement or a judgment. To find a lawyer, a good place to start it is this website: http://www.illinoislawyerfinder.com/find-a-lawyer. If you are not able to find a contingency fee lawyer who is interested in your case, that is usually a sign that the case is not a strong one.

If you decide to re-file the case on your own, you should keep in mind all of the following:

the statute of limitations could bar any claims arising out of actions occurring more than 5 years prior to the date that you initially filed the case that was dismissed, so it will be necessary to focus on matters occurring during the more recent time period;
the completion of your prior lawsuit against Scottie Pippen might be grounds for dismissal of any claims against him that arise out of actions occurring before that lawsuit was done;
your complaint will have to allege specific facts about what each defendant did;
you should take care to limit the number of filings you make in the case. The sheer volume of what you filed with the circuit court in this case is highly unusual.
the judge may be very skeptical of your case given the number of other cases that you have filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County.

I hope this information is helpful. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thursday, September 4, 2025

YOU DON'T MEAN SHIT TO ME

YOU BAD AS HELL

HELLO ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT PREPARING THE FILE TO SEND TO YOU

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

Chyvette A. Valentine,
Plaintiff–Appellant, Pro Se

Scottie M. Pippen, et al.,
Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal No. 1-25-1195

On Petition for Leave to Appeal from the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, No. 1-25-1195,
from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Case No. 2024-L-002166,
Hon. Maire Dempsey, Judge Presiding.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

NOW COMES Plaintiff–Appellant, Chyvette A. Valentine, appearing pro se, and pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315, respectfully petitions this Court for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, First District, in the above-captioned matter.

Table of Authorities ............................................................ i
Jurisdictional Statement .................................................... 1
Issues Presented for Review ............................................... 2
Statement of the Case and Facts ....................................... 3
Reasons for Granting the Petition ...................................... 5
Argument ........................................................................ 7
Conclusion ..................................................................... 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954)
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973)
People v. Majer, 131 Ill. App. 3d 80 (1st Dist. 1985)
People v. Salem, 2016 IL 118693

Statutes & Constitutional Provisions

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)
42 U.S.C. § 1983
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2

Illinois Supreme Court Rules

Rule 315
Rule 367
Rule 61, Canon 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction under Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a), which permits discretionary review of Appellate Court judgments. Federal questions are implicated under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the Appellate Court’s denial of rehearing without meaningful consideration deprives Appellant of due process and equal protection.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Appellate Court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing on the same day it was filed, raising substantial concerns regarding due process and the appearance of justice.
Whether such summary denials contravene Rule 367 and violate Appellant’s rights under the Illinois and U.S. Constitutions.
Whether judicial conduct in this matter raises issues under Rule 61, Canon 2 of the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct, requiring impartiality and avoidance of impropriety.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Appellant filed civil claims in Cook County Law Division under Case No. 2024-L-002166, alleging harassment, defamation, economic interference, and related damages. Default judgment proceedings were pending.

On September 3, 2025, Appellant submitted a Motion for Rehearing in the Appellate Court, First District. The motion was denied the very same day without briefing, deliberation, or apparent consideration.

This rapid disposition undermines the principle that litigants are entitled to meaningful review, particularly in matters involving fundamental rights and allegations of long-term harassment and misconduct.

Appellant now seeks discretionary review by the Illinois Supreme Court to ensure adherence to due process, equal protection, and judicial integrity.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Constitutional Questions of Great Importance – Whether same-day denials of rehearing comport with the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
Conflict with Precedent – Evitts v. Lucey, Griffin v. Illinois, and Illinois cases emphasize meaningful appellate review, not perfunctory denial.
Public Confidence in Judiciary – Appearance of impartiality is critical. Same-day denials erode trust in appellate procedures. See Offutt v. United States.
Unresolved Statewide Question – No clear Illinois precedent exists on whether rehearing petitions must receive deliberative review. Clarification is required.

ARGUMENT

I. SAME-DAY DENIAL VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION.

The Fourteenth Amendment and Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2 guarantee fairness in judicial proceedings. By denying Appellant’s motion within hours of filing, the Appellate Court effectively deprived Appellant of a genuine opportunity for consideration. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).

II. RULE 367 REQUIRES MEANINGFUL REVIEW, NOT PERFUNCTORY DENIAL.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367(a) contemplates petitions for rehearing as an opportunity for correction of errors. A same-day denial suggests no meaningful review occurred, conflicting with the rule’s intent.

III. THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE DEMANDS THIS COURT’S INTERVENTION.

In Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954), the Court held that justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. When litigants perceive bias or pre-judgment, public confidence is undermined.

IV. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT STATEWIDE ISSUE.

This Court has emphasized the need for reasoned decisions to preserve judicial integrity. People v. Salem, 2016 IL 118693. The Court should clarify whether Illinois appellate procedure permits same-day denials without substantive review.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court:

Grant this Petition for Leave to Appeal under Rule 315;
Accept jurisdiction to review the Appellate Court’s summary denial; and
Grant such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

MY CLIENT: DEVONTE PIPPEN

"I Used to Believe in the System"

I used to believe in the criminal justice system until I endured this madness firsthand. What I’ve experienced is not justice, but a web of cover-ups, delays, and blatant disregard for truth.

I wish I could say Scottie was worth all of this, but he’s not. My civil claim was dismissed, and when I appealed, it was sent back without true consideration. I did everything by the book followed the rules, met the deadlines, respected the process. Scottie was served on December 18, 2024. He failed to respond by January 17, 2025. Those are facts. Yet somehow, despite his default, he walked away untouched.

The amount of effort spent to conceal and bury this case is staggering. Judges colluded, decisions were influenced, and once again, money outweighed truth. It’s exhausting to even speak on it anymore. At this point, I may never see a dime, but the pain goes far beyond money. My son lost his life without accountability. My family has been torn apart. My reputation damaged. My life uprooted all for a man who is not worth the destruction.

As a Black woman in America, I now see clearly that the promise of a fair trial was never meant for me. I can finally stop lying to myself about that.

I believed in justice once. I don’t anymore.

Fuck You and Scottie Punk Bitch Ass

Dear Members of the Judicial Inquiry Board,

I am writing to respectfully bring to your attention a concern regarding the handling of my appeal, Valentine v. Pippen, et al., Appeal No. 1-25-1195, in the Illinois Appellate Court, First District.

On September 3, 2025, I filed a Motion for Rehearing. To my astonishment, I received a denial the very same day. As a self-represented litigant, I am dumbfounded as to how such a filing could be reviewed, considered, and denied so quickly. The speed of the denial raises a serious question about whether my case has been given meaningful judicial review or whether it has been treated with undue priority for rejection.

My concern is not simply about the unfavorable ruling, but about the appearance of fairness and due process. Illinois courts emphasize that litigants must have confidence that filings are given thoughtful consideration. When a Motion for Rehearing is denied within hours of its submission, it undermines the appearance of impartiality and raises legitimate doubts about whether equal justice is being administered.

I am in the process of filing a Petition for Leave to Appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, but I also believe it is appropriate to bring this issue to the attention of the Judicial Inquiry Board to ensure that no impropriety, bias, or unfair practice is occurring in my case.

I respectfully request that your office review this matter and advise whether further investigation is warranted.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Chyvette A. Valentine
Plaintiff–Appellant, Pro Se

Wednesday, September 3, 2025

PETITION FOR LEAVE FILED

THEY OPENED THE DOOR #SUPREME

PETITION FOR REHEARING #FILED

No.1-25-1195

In the

Appellate Court of Illinois

First Judicial District

CHYVETTE A. VALENTINE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

SCOTTIE PIPPEN,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

LARSA PIPPEN, CARL T. PIPPEN,

MELISSA PIPPEN, JASON GILER, et al.,

Defendants.

On Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,

County Department, Law Division, No. 24 L2166

The Honorable Kathy M. Flanagan, Judge Presiding.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

(Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367)

NOW COMES Plaintiff Appellant, Chyvette A. Valentine, appearing pro se, and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for rehearing pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367, and in support thereof states as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

This Court’s dismissal of the instant appeal conflicts with controlling Illinois precedent governing appellate jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). Unless corrected, the dismissal effectively nullifies Appellant’s right to appellate review of a final judgment entered in the trial court and results in manifest injustice.

II. ORDERS WITH RULE 304(a) FINDINGS ARE APPEALABLE

1. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) expressly authorizes appellate review where a judgment disposes of fewer than all claims or parties, so long as the trial court enters a written finding that “there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.”

2. The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently recognized that such orders are final and appealable: In re Marriage of Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 153 (2008): “Rule 304(a) expressly authorizes appeals from final judgments as to fewer than all parties or claims where an appropriate finding has been made.” Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 23: “A judgment that resolves a distinct claim in a multi-claim proceeding is final and appealable if accompanied by Rule 304(a) language.”

3. Here, the trial court entered a default judgment matter set before Judge Maire Dempsey on May 22, 2025, which disposed of claims against certain defendants. That judgment is not interlocutory it is a final adjudication properly subject to appellate review.

4. Dismissing this appeal despite the trial court’s dispositive judgment directly conflicts with the above authorities and deprives this Court of jurisdiction it is required to exercise.

III. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS REVIEW ON THE MERITS

5. Illinois courts have long recognized that jurisdictional rules should be applied in a manner that protects, rather than defeats, the right to appellate review: Lewanski v. Lewanski, 59 Ill. App. 3d 805, 817 (1st Dist. 1978): “Rules governing appeals should be liberally construed to afford parties their right to a review on the merits wherever possible.”

6. If the dismissal stands, Appellant will be denied appellate review of a valid final judgment, contrary to the strong public policy favoring consideration of cases on their merits.

IV. DISMISSAL VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO COURTS

7. The Illinois Constitution guarantees all people the right to seek redress through the courts. Article I, §12 provides that “[a]ll courts shall be open; and every person shall have remedy by due course of law.”

8. Dismissing this appeal effectively denies Appellant access to a court of review for a valid, final judgment, thereby violating her constitutional right to a remedy and due process.

9. Illinois courts have recognized that procedural dismissals that prevent a party from having a full hearing on the merits may constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights:

See People v. Simmons, 189 Ill. 2d 184, 191 (2000): procedural bars cannot override fundamental due process protections. See Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 2011 IL App (1st) 102572, ¶ 29: “Courts must be careful not to deny litigants the opportunity to have their claims decided on the merits where a final judgment exists.”

10. Accordingly, reinstating the appeal is necessary to preserve Appellant’s constitutional rights, ensure compliance with Illinois law, and avoid manifest injustice.

V. RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court:

1. Grant rehearing under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367.

2. Reinstate the appeal for full consideration on the merits, including the default judgment set before Judge Maire Dempsey on May 22, 2025; and

3. Grant such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

HOMEWORK #DONE
APPELLATE BRIEF 1-25-1195
FILED TODAY

No. 1-25-1195

─────────────────────────────────────────

In the

Appellate Court of Illinois

First Judicial District

──────────────────────────────────────────

CHYVETTE A. VALENTINE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

SCOTTIE PIPPEN,

Defendant-Appellee, and

LARSA PIPPEN, CARL T. PIPPEN,

MELISSA PIPPEN, JASON GILER, et al.,

Defendants.

──────────────────────────

On Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,

County Department, Law Division, No. 24 L 2166

The Honorable Kathy M. Flanagan, Judge Presiding.

──────────────────────────

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Nature of the Case .................................................................... 4
Issues Presented for Review .................................................. 4
Statement of Jurisdiction ....................................................... 5
Statutes (Laws) Involved ....................................................... 5
Statement of Facts .................................................................. 5
Standard of Review ................................................................ 6
Points and Authorities for Argument .................................... 6
A. Default Judgment Was Warranted .................................. 7
B. Defendants’ Appearance Was Defective ....................... 7
C. The DWP Order Violated Due Process .......................... 7
Conclusion & Prayer for Relief .............................................. 8
Certificate of Compliance ..................................................... 9
Certificate of Service ............................................................ 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes & Rules

735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d)
735 ILCS 5/2-203
735 ILCS 5/1-109
Illinois Supreme Court Rules 12, 13(c)(1), 101–105, 181(a), 301, 303, 341
50 U.S.C. § 3931(b)(1) (Servicemembers Civil Relief Act)

Cases

Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334 (2007)
Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Karbowski, 2014 IL App (1st) 130112
Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432
Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495 (1991)
Bryson v. News America Publs., Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77 (1996)
People ex rel. Reid v. Adkins, 48 Ill. App. 3d 598 (1st Dist. 1977)

1. NATURE OF THE CASE

1.1 This case arises from Plaintiff–Appellant’s civil action against Defendants–Appellees for various claims properly filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County.

1.2 All Defendants were duly served between October and December 2024. Defendants failed to appear or plead within the time required by law.

1.3 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment and Prove-Up, which was set for hearing before the assigned judge, Hon. Maire Dempsey, on May 22, 2025.

1.4 Before that scheduled hearing, Judge Kathy M. Flanagan, who was not the assigned judge, dismissed the matter for want of prosecution on May 2, 2025. On June 16, 2025, Judge Flanagan also entered an order striking all future appearances.

1.5 Plaintiff appeals from those orders, contending that the trial court erred in dismissing the action and in failing to enter default judgment against Defendants.

2. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

2.1 Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the action for want of prosecution where Defendants had been duly served, failed to appear, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment was pending.

2.2 Whether the appearance entered on May 2, 2025, without compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 13(c)(1), was a legal nullity.

2.3 Whether the dismissal orders entered by Judge Flanagan, without notice, hearing, or authority as the assigned judge, violated due process under the Illinois Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

3.1 The trial court entered its dismissal order on May 2, 2025, and a subsequent order on June 16, 2025.

3.2 Both orders disposed of Plaintiff’s claims, making them final and appealable.

3.3 Plaintiff timely filed her Notice of Appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303(a).

3.4 This Court has jurisdiction under Article VI, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution and Rule 301.

4. STATUTES (LAWS) INVOLVED

735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d) (default judgments)
735 ILCS 5/2-203 (service of summons)
735 ILCS 5/1-109 (verification and perjury provision)
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 181(a) (time to appear or plead)
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 13(c)(1) (written appearance requirement)
Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301, 303, 341 (appellate procedure)
50 U.S.C. § 3931(b)(1) (Servicemembers Civil Relief Act)

5. STATEMENT OF FACTS

5.1 Between October and December 2024, all Defendants were served in compliance with Illinois law.

5.2 Defendants failed to file appearances or responsive pleadings within the thirty-day period required under Supreme Court Rule 181(a).

5.3 Plaintiff filed Proof of Service on April 4, 2025.

5.4 On May 2, 2025, Judge Kathy M. Flanagan (not the assigned judge) dismissed the case for want of prosecution, even though Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and Prove-Up was scheduled before Judge Maire Dempsey on May 22, 2025.

5.5 On June 16, 2025, Judge Flanagan entered another order striking all future appearances without notice, motion, or hearing.

5.6 Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

6. STANDARD OF REVIEW

6.1 Orders dismissing a case for want of prosecution and rulings concerning default judgment are reviewed de novo when they raise legal issues, and for abuse of discretion when judicial discretion is involved. Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 36.

7. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FOR ARGUMENT

A. Default Judgment Was Warranted

Authority: 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d); Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334 (2007); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Karbowski, 2014 IL App (1st) 130112.
Argument: Defendants failed to appear or plead after proper service. Under Illinois law, this failure warrants default judgment, with all well-pled allegations deemed admitted. The trial court erred in dismissing rather than entering default.

B. Defendants’ Appearance Was Defective

Authority: Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 13(c)(1); Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432.
Argument: No written appearance was filed as required by Rule 13(c)(1). Any oral or informal appearance was a nullity. The trial court improperly treated Defendants as having appeared.

C. The DWP Orders Violated Due Process

Authority: People ex rel. Reid v. Adkins, 48 Ill. App. 3d 598 (1st Dist. 1977); Illinois Const. art. I, § 2; U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Argument: Judge Flanagan was not the assigned judge and lacked authority to dismiss the case. The dismissals were entered without notice, hearing, or opportunity to be heard, violating Plaintiff’s rights to due process.

8. CONCLUSION & PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff–Appellant respectfully requests that this Court:

Reverse the May 2, 2025, dismissal for want of prosecution.
Vacate June 16, 2025, order striking future appearances.
Remand with instructions to reinstate the case and proceed with Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and Prove-Up.
Declare the May 2 and June 16 orders void ab initio; and
Grant such further relief as justice may require.