I refuse to downplay my intelligence... to make you comfortable with your ignorance: Wednesday, September 3, 2025

Wednesday, September 3, 2025

HELLO ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT PREPARING THE FILE TO SEND TO YOU

PETITION FOR REHEARING #FILED

No.1-25-1195

In the

Appellate Court of Illinois

First Judicial District

CHYVETTE A. VALENTINE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

SCOTTIE PIPPEN,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

LARSA PIPPEN, CARL T. PIPPEN,

MELISSA PIPPEN, JASON GILER, et al.,

Defendants.

On Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,

County Department, Law Division, No. 24 L2166

The Honorable Kathy M. Flanagan, Judge Presiding.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

(Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367)

NOW COMES Plaintiff Appellant, Chyvette A. Valentine, appearing pro se, and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for rehearing pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367, and in support thereof states as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

This Court’s dismissal of the instant appeal conflicts with controlling Illinois precedent governing appellate jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). Unless corrected, the dismissal effectively nullifies Appellant’s right to appellate review of a final judgment entered in the trial court and results in manifest injustice.

II. ORDERS WITH RULE 304(a) FINDINGS ARE APPEALABLE

1. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) expressly authorizes appellate review where a judgment disposes of fewer than all claims or parties, so long as the trial court enters a written finding that “there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.”

2. The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently recognized that such orders are final and appealable: In re Marriage of Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 153 (2008): “Rule 304(a) expressly authorizes appeals from final judgments as to fewer than all parties or claims where an appropriate finding has been made.” Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 23: “A judgment that resolves a distinct claim in a multi-claim proceeding is final and appealable if accompanied by Rule 304(a) language.”

3. Here, the trial court entered a default judgment matter set before Judge Maire Dempsey on May 22, 2025, which disposed of claims against certain defendants. That judgment is not interlocutory it is a final adjudication properly subject to appellate review.

4. Dismissing this appeal despite the trial court’s dispositive judgment directly conflicts with the above authorities and deprives this Court of jurisdiction it is required to exercise.

III. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS REVIEW ON THE MERITS

5. Illinois courts have long recognized that jurisdictional rules should be applied in a manner that protects, rather than defeats, the right to appellate review: Lewanski v. Lewanski, 59 Ill. App. 3d 805, 817 (1st Dist. 1978): “Rules governing appeals should be liberally construed to afford parties their right to a review on the merits wherever possible.”

6. If the dismissal stands, Appellant will be denied appellate review of a valid final judgment, contrary to the strong public policy favoring consideration of cases on their merits.

IV. DISMISSAL VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO COURTS

7. The Illinois Constitution guarantees all people the right to seek redress through the courts. Article I, §12 provides that “[a]ll courts shall be open; and every person shall have remedy by due course of law.”

8. Dismissing this appeal effectively denies Appellant access to a court of review for a valid, final judgment, thereby violating her constitutional right to a remedy and due process.

9. Illinois courts have recognized that procedural dismissals that prevent a party from having a full hearing on the merits may constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights:

See People v. Simmons, 189 Ill. 2d 184, 191 (2000): procedural bars cannot override fundamental due process protections. See Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 2011 IL App (1st) 102572, ¶ 29: “Courts must be careful not to deny litigants the opportunity to have their claims decided on the merits where a final judgment exists.”

10. Accordingly, reinstating the appeal is necessary to preserve Appellant’s constitutional rights, ensure compliance with Illinois law, and avoid manifest injustice.

V. RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court:

1. Grant rehearing under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367.

2. Reinstate the appeal for full consideration on the merits, including the default judgment set before Judge Maire Dempsey on May 22, 2025; and

3. Grant such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

HOMEWORK #DONE
APPELLATE BRIEF 1-25-1195
FILED TODAY

No. 1-25-1195

─────────────────────────────────────────

In the

Appellate Court of Illinois

First Judicial District

──────────────────────────────────────────

CHYVETTE A. VALENTINE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

SCOTTIE PIPPEN,

Defendant-Appellee, and

LARSA PIPPEN, CARL T. PIPPEN,

MELISSA PIPPEN, JASON GILER, et al.,

Defendants.

──────────────────────────

On Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,

County Department, Law Division, No. 24 L 2166

The Honorable Kathy M. Flanagan, Judge Presiding.

──────────────────────────

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Nature of the Case .................................................................... 4
Issues Presented for Review .................................................. 4
Statement of Jurisdiction ....................................................... 5
Statutes (Laws) Involved ....................................................... 5
Statement of Facts .................................................................. 5
Standard of Review ................................................................ 6
Points and Authorities for Argument .................................... 6
A. Default Judgment Was Warranted .................................. 7
B. Defendants’ Appearance Was Defective ....................... 7
C. The DWP Order Violated Due Process .......................... 7
Conclusion & Prayer for Relief .............................................. 8
Certificate of Compliance ..................................................... 9
Certificate of Service ............................................................ 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes & Rules

735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d)
735 ILCS 5/2-203
735 ILCS 5/1-109
Illinois Supreme Court Rules 12, 13(c)(1), 101–105, 181(a), 301, 303, 341
50 U.S.C. § 3931(b)(1) (Servicemembers Civil Relief Act)

Cases

Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334 (2007)
Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Karbowski, 2014 IL App (1st) 130112
Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432
Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495 (1991)
Bryson v. News America Publs., Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77 (1996)
People ex rel. Reid v. Adkins, 48 Ill. App. 3d 598 (1st Dist. 1977)

1. NATURE OF THE CASE

1.1 This case arises from Plaintiff–Appellant’s civil action against Defendants–Appellees for various claims properly filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County.

1.2 All Defendants were duly served between October and December 2024. Defendants failed to appear or plead within the time required by law.

1.3 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment and Prove-Up, which was set for hearing before the assigned judge, Hon. Maire Dempsey, on May 22, 2025.

1.4 Before that scheduled hearing, Judge Kathy M. Flanagan, who was not the assigned judge, dismissed the matter for want of prosecution on May 2, 2025. On June 16, 2025, Judge Flanagan also entered an order striking all future appearances.

1.5 Plaintiff appeals from those orders, contending that the trial court erred in dismissing the action and in failing to enter default judgment against Defendants.

2. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

2.1 Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the action for want of prosecution where Defendants had been duly served, failed to appear, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment was pending.

2.2 Whether the appearance entered on May 2, 2025, without compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 13(c)(1), was a legal nullity.

2.3 Whether the dismissal orders entered by Judge Flanagan, without notice, hearing, or authority as the assigned judge, violated due process under the Illinois Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

3.1 The trial court entered its dismissal order on May 2, 2025, and a subsequent order on June 16, 2025.

3.2 Both orders disposed of Plaintiff’s claims, making them final and appealable.

3.3 Plaintiff timely filed her Notice of Appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303(a).

3.4 This Court has jurisdiction under Article VI, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution and Rule 301.

4. STATUTES (LAWS) INVOLVED

735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d) (default judgments)
735 ILCS 5/2-203 (service of summons)
735 ILCS 5/1-109 (verification and perjury provision)
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 181(a) (time to appear or plead)
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 13(c)(1) (written appearance requirement)
Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301, 303, 341 (appellate procedure)
50 U.S.C. § 3931(b)(1) (Servicemembers Civil Relief Act)

5. STATEMENT OF FACTS

5.1 Between October and December 2024, all Defendants were served in compliance with Illinois law.

5.2 Defendants failed to file appearances or responsive pleadings within the thirty-day period required under Supreme Court Rule 181(a).

5.3 Plaintiff filed Proof of Service on April 4, 2025.

5.4 On May 2, 2025, Judge Kathy M. Flanagan (not the assigned judge) dismissed the case for want of prosecution, even though Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and Prove-Up was scheduled before Judge Maire Dempsey on May 22, 2025.

5.5 On June 16, 2025, Judge Flanagan entered another order striking all future appearances without notice, motion, or hearing.

5.6 Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

6. STANDARD OF REVIEW

6.1 Orders dismissing a case for want of prosecution and rulings concerning default judgment are reviewed de novo when they raise legal issues, and for abuse of discretion when judicial discretion is involved. Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 36.

7. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FOR ARGUMENT

A. Default Judgment Was Warranted

Authority: 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d); Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334 (2007); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Karbowski, 2014 IL App (1st) 130112.
Argument: Defendants failed to appear or plead after proper service. Under Illinois law, this failure warrants default judgment, with all well-pled allegations deemed admitted. The trial court erred in dismissing rather than entering default.

B. Defendants’ Appearance Was Defective

Authority: Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 13(c)(1); Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432.
Argument: No written appearance was filed as required by Rule 13(c)(1). Any oral or informal appearance was a nullity. The trial court improperly treated Defendants as having appeared.

C. The DWP Orders Violated Due Process

Authority: People ex rel. Reid v. Adkins, 48 Ill. App. 3d 598 (1st Dist. 1977); Illinois Const. art. I, § 2; U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Argument: Judge Flanagan was not the assigned judge and lacked authority to dismiss the case. The dismissals were entered without notice, hearing, or opportunity to be heard, violating Plaintiff’s rights to due process.

8. CONCLUSION & PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff–Appellant respectfully requests that this Court:

Reverse the May 2, 2025, dismissal for want of prosecution.
Vacate June 16, 2025, order striking future appearances.
Remand with instructions to reinstate the case and proceed with Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and Prove-Up.
Declare the May 2 and June 16 orders void ab initio; and
Grant such further relief as justice may require.