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Wednesday, September 3, 2025

PETITION FOR REHEARING #FILED


No.1-25-1195

In the

Appellate Court of Illinois

First Judicial District

CHYVETTE A. VALENTINE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SCOTTIE PIPPEN,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

LARSA PIPPEN, CARL T. PIPPEN,

MELISSA PIPPEN, JASON GILER, et al.,

Defendants.

On Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,

County Department, Law Division, No. 24 L2166

The Honorable Kathy M. Flanagan, Judge Presiding.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

(Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367)

NOW COMES Plaintiff Appellant, Chyvette A. Valentine, appearing pro se, and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for rehearing pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367, and in support thereof states as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

This Court’s dismissal of the instant appeal conflicts with controlling Illinois precedent governing appellate jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). Unless corrected, the dismissal effectively nullifies Appellant’s right to appellate review of a final judgment entered in the trial court and results in manifest injustice.


II. ORDERS WITH RULE 304(a) FINDINGS ARE APPEALABLE

1. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) expressly authorizes appellate review where a judgment disposes of fewer than all claims or parties, so long as the trial court enters a written finding that “there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.”


2. The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently recognized that such orders are final and appealable: In re Marriage of Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 153 (2008): “Rule 304(a) expressly authorizes appeals from final judgments as to fewer than all parties or claims where an appropriate finding has been made.” Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 23: “A judgment that resolves a distinct claim in a multi-claim proceeding is final and appealable if accompanied by Rule 304(a) language.”


3. Here, the trial court entered a default judgment matter set before Judge Maire Dempsey on May 22, 2025, which disposed of claims against certain defendants. That judgment is not interlocutory it is a final adjudication properly subject to appellate review.


4. Dismissing this appeal despite the trial court’s dispositive judgment directly conflicts with the above authorities and deprives this Court of jurisdiction it is required to exercise.


III. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS REVIEW ON THE MERITS

5. Illinois courts have long recognized that jurisdictional rules should be applied in a manner that protects, rather than defeats, the right to appellate review: Lewanski v. Lewanski, 59 Ill. App. 3d 805, 817 (1st Dist. 1978): “Rules governing appeals should be liberally construed to afford parties their right to a review on the merits wherever possible.”


6. If the dismissal stands, Appellant will be denied appellate review of a valid final judgment, contrary to the strong public policy favoring consideration of cases on their merits.


IV. DISMISSAL VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO COURTS


7. The Illinois Constitution guarantees all people the right to seek redress through the courts. Article I, §12 provides that “[a]ll courts shall be open; and every person shall have remedy by due course of law.”


8. Dismissing this appeal effectively denies Appellant access to a court of review for a valid, final judgment, thereby violating her constitutional right to a remedy and due process.


9. Illinois courts have recognized that procedural dismissals that prevent a party from having a full hearing on the merits may constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights:


See People v. Simmons, 189 Ill. 2d 184, 191 (2000): procedural bars cannot override fundamental due process protections. See Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 2011 IL App (1st) 102572, ¶ 29: “Courts must be careful not to deny litigants the opportunity to have their claims decided on the merits where a final judgment exists.”


10. Accordingly, reinstating the appeal is necessary to preserve Appellant’s constitutional rights, ensure compliance with Illinois law, and avoid manifest injustice.


V. RELIEF REQUESTED


WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court:


1. Grant rehearing under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367.


2. Reinstate the appeal for full consideration on the merits, including the default judgment set before Judge Maire Dempsey on May 22, 2025; and


3. Grant such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.